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Republicans control bothhouses of Congress as well asthe presidency. Control means
accountability, and large federal
budget deficits do not harmonize
with the Republican self-image of
fiscal prudence. Thus, one of the top
agenda items this spring and summer
will be how to reduce the federal
budget deficit.
President Bush and congres-
sional leaders have ruled out tax in-
creases. This leaves only two ways of
reducing the deficit: either spending
will have to be reduced or we can
hope to experience an unexpected
boom in economic growth. Basing
fiscal policy on hope is not prudent,
so most observers think that the
president and Congress will try to
reduce spending. Agricultural spend-
ing is again on the table for budget
cuts. Senator Judd Gregg of New
Hampshire, chairman of the Senate
Budget Committee, says that he will
scrutinize farm programs and that
“Agricultural entitlements are crying
out to be reformed.” Farm groups are
working both to forestall cuts to
farm programs and to figure out
where cuts should be made if they
are inevitable.
An optimistic way of looking at
spending cuts is that they present an
opportunity to improve program per-
formance. After all, reducing farm
spending will not inevitably harm
farmers. For example, land owners
will bear the brunt of cuts to com-
modity programs through a decline
in land rents and land prices. Be-
cause most farmland is owned by
absentee landlords, such cuts will
have a smaller impact on farm opera-
tors than would seem likely. In addi-
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tion, smart reforms of farm programs
could result in both lower costs and
better farm programs. Replacing the
marketing loan program with an ex-
panded countercyclical payment
program would make U.S. farm pro-
grams more compliant with World
Trade Organization negotiations and
would reduce spending while leav-
ing the U.S. farm safety net largely in
place. Another program that is ripe
for reform is the U.S. crop insurance
program. One simple change would
be to eliminate the option whereby
farmers can insure against losses on
a field-by-field basis. As will be dem-
onstrated, elimination of this option
would save taxpayers more than
$300 million while having no impact
on the ability of the crop insurance
program to meet its primary purpose
of providing assistance when farm
income is low.
Before getting into the details of
such a crop insurance reform, it is
useful to take a brief detour into our
federal government’s books to see
why farm groups’ fears of spending
cuts are well founded.
A “GUNS AND BUTTER” FEDERAL
FISCAL POLICY
The best way to understand our fed-
eral fiscal policy is to measure tax re-
ceipts, government expenditures, and
the resulting deficit or surplus as a
percentage of gross domestic product
(GDP). GDP is the most inclusive mea-
sure of the income of a country, so
adjusting taxes and spending by GDP
can help give a better perspective of
their relative magnitude.
Figure 1 shows federal tax re-
ceipts, outlays, and deficits since
1980 expressed as a percentage of
GDP. As shown, total outlays were
fairly constant at about 22 percent of
GDP until about 1992, at which time
they began a long decline that was
reversed in fiscal year 2002 (which
runs from October 1, 2001 to Septem-
ber 30, 2002). This reversal can be
explained by fairly large increases in
both defense and non-defense
FIGURE 1. TOTAL FEDERAL RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS AS A PERCENTAGE OF
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
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spending, which came about be-
cause Congress did away with the
“pay-as-you-go” rules that restrained
spending throughout President
Clinton’s two terms in office.
The pattern of tax receipts more
closely follows the business cycle.
The deep recession in the early
1980s and the milder recession in the
early 1990s show up as declines in
receipts. Congress passed tax in-
creases in 1993, which, combined
with the economic growth in the
1990s, grew federal tax receipts to
above 20 percent of GDP. This growth
in tax revenue, combined with
spending restraint, led to budget sur-
pluses from 1998 to 2001. A mild re-
cession in 2001 and tax cuts passed
by Congress have led to a dramatic
downturn in federal tax receipts.
This drop in receipts, combined with
an increase in spending, has in-
creased the budget deficit to about
3.5 percent of GDP.
Apologists note that the deficits
are not as large as they were in the
mid-1980s when they were regularly
5 percent of GDP. However, the rea-
son they are not as large is that we
are generating a large surplus in the
so-called off-budget accounts, which
consist primarily of the social secu-
rity surplus. This surplus was created
by policy reforms (tax increases and
benefit cuts) in the mid-1980s. We are
currently running a surplus of about
1.5 percent of GDP in this fund. When
this surplus is accounted for, we are
running budget deficits of about 5
percent of GDP.
Subtracting the off-budget sur-
plus shows a clearer picture of fed-
eral finances. After all, social
security surpluses are being gener-
ated today so that we have the finan-
cial resources to pay promised
benefits tomorrow. It is this last pic-
ture of federal finances that has
many economists worried that we
are truly pursuing a “guns and but-
ter” fiscal policy whereby we are bor-
rowing about 5 percent of GDP from
overseas lenders to pay for our guns
(military spending) and butter (do-
mestic programs).
The Congressional Budget Of-
fice projects that the budget deficit
will be reduced to around 2 percent
of GDP by 2010. But this is an unreal-
istic projection on which to base
policy because it makes two ques-
tionable assumptions: that Presi-
dent Bush’s tax cuts will be
rescinded and that the alternative
minimum tax will not be reformed or
eliminated. Thus, cutting spending
really is the only tool deficit hawks
can use to cut the deficit.
Figure 2 gives a breakdown of
our federal spending. Nondiscre-
tionary spending and interest on the
debt are considered off limits to bud-
get cutters. This eliminates fully 61
percent of the budget. Thus, spend-
ing cuts must come from discretion-
ary spending.
In the short run, it is unlikely
that Congress will cut military
spending because of President
Bush’s Iraq commitment. In fact,
holding defense spending constant
will require a significant reduction
in planned expansion of weapon
systems. Thus, we are left with cut-
ting non-defense, non-discretionary
savings, which accounts for 19 per-
cent of the federal budget.
To illustrate the problem facing
deficit hawks, if all non-defense, non-
discretionary outlays were entirely
eliminated, this would reduce total
spending by 3.1 percent of GDP. As
shown in Figure 1, a spending cut of
this magnitude would not eliminate
the budget deficit. We would still be
in red ink but the National Weather
Service, National Science Founda-
tion, National Institutes of Health,
National Parks System, FBI, EPA, De-
partment of Education, U.S. farm pro-
grams, and many other federal
programs funded out of discretion-
ary spending would be gone.
This brief exploration of the
problem facing budget cutters shows
why they will be taking a hard look
at all agencies and programs for ar-
eas where efficiencies can be in-
creased or programs can be
eliminated. And agricultural pro-
grams are a prime target.
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SAVING MONEY FROM SMART REFORM
OF THE CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM
The crop insurance program pro-
vides an example of a smart reform
that can both save money and im-
prove the program. To understand
how this might work, we must first
review some program details.
Congress last reformed the crop
insurance program in 2000 by signifi-
cantly increasing the subsidies farm-
ers receive when they buy more
expensive, lower deductible policies.
The new subsidies resulted in a sig-
nificant increase is the amount of
insurance that U.S. farmers purchase
each year, which was the objective of
the reform. Total (unsubsidized)
crop insurance premiums, which are
the best measure of the size of the
program, have increased 68 percent
since 2000.
This growth in the program is a
direct result of the way that farmers
receive their subsidies. Congress
mandated that per acre subsidies
must be proportionate to total pre-
miums. Thus, the more farmers pay
for insurance, the more they receive
in subsidies. Farmers have many
choices in the program. They choose
which products to buy (Revenue As-
surance, Crop Revenue Coverage, or
standard yield insurance); the level
of coverage to purchase; and
whether to insure their fields in sepa-
rate insurance units or to combine
them into a single unit.
The particular subsidy propor-
tions chosen by Congress create an
incentive for most farmers to buy
insurance at the 75 percent coverage
level (a 25 percent deductible). At
this coverage level, farmers pay only
$45 for each $100 worth of insurance
that they purchase. This creates a
large incentive for farmers to pur-
chase the most expensive insurance
that is available to them. The most
expensive insurance available is Rev-
enue Assurance with the harvest
price option (or Crop Revenue Cover-
age, which gives equivalent cover-
age) and insuring crops on a
field-by-field basis, which is known
as buying “optional units.” It is this
incentive for buying optional units
that could allow a large impact un-
der smart reform.
OPTIONAL UNITS IN CROP INSURANCE
Farmers who grow a crop on more
than one section of land can create a
separate insurance unit—an “op-
tional unit”—for the land in each
section. Each optional unit stands
alone when it comes time to calcu-
late premiums and indemnities. If
hail damages a crop on one unit, the
farmer will receive an insurance in-
demnity to cover the hail losses. This
payment arrives even if the farmer’s
other field units receive beneficial
rainfall instead of hail.
The alternative to optional units
is to insure all of a farmer’s crop in a
single insurance unit. The insurance
guarantee on this single unit is ex-
actly equal to the sum of the insur-
ance guarantees on the optional
units. However, the frequency of in-
surance payments will be lower on
the single unit because production
from all fields is pooled together
when calculating whether there is a
loss. Reflecting this lower frequency
of payments, USDA charges a 10 per-
cent insurance surcharge for op-
tional unit coverage.
Why would farmers pay a pre-
mium surcharge for no increase in
their insurance guarantee? The ex-
planation, of course, is that because
of the proportionate subsidies, farm-
ers only pay a surcharge of 4.5 per-
cent. What farmer would not pay 45¢
for coverage that returns $1.00? Ap-
proximately 90 percent of land en-
rolled in the crop insurance program
is enrolled as optional units.
A smart reform of the crop insur-
ance program would be to either
eliminate the ability of farmers to buy
optional unit coverage or to elimi-
nate the additional subsidy that farm-
ers receive for buying optional unit
coverage. The first reform option has
the added benefit of a reduction in
fraud and abuse of the program by
making it more difficult for dishonest
farmers to “move” production among
fields either to make false insurance
claims or to build up a higher yield
history on a particular field in order
to increase its eligibility for higher
future levels of insurance.
COST SAVINGS FROM SMART REFORM
Significant cost savings would ac-
crue from elimination of optional
unit coverage. Table 1 (page 5) sum-
marizes the estimated changes in
taxpayer costs from this reform for
fiscal year 2006, assuming that 90
percent of acreage is insured under
optional units. Reducing premiums
by 10 percent on 90 percent of the
business reduces expected insur-
ance payouts, cost reimbursements
to crop insurance companies, and
underwriting gains by 8.18 percent.
Taxpayer costs of this program
could be reduced by approximately
$330 million. And because the total
FIGURE 2. FEDERAL SPENDING CATEGORIES
Continued on page 5
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insurance guarantee would remain
the same for farmers, this cost sav-
ings comes about with absolutely
no impact on the ability of the crop
insurance program to provide in-
come support when a farmer’s mar-
ket income falls short of the
insurance guarantee.
IS SMART REFORM DOABLE?
The word around Washington is that
departments and agencies are being
asked to identify perhaps 8 percent
of their budgets that can be cut. If
these cuts were to be made on a pro-
gram-by-program basis, then the
USDA’s Risk Management Agency
would be forced to cut projected
spending by 8 percent. Elimination
of optional unit coverage would ac-
TABLE 1. ESTIMATED CHANGES IN TAXPAYER COSTS FROM CROP INSURANCE
REFORM (FY 2006)
Current Program No Optional Units
(billion $) (billion $)
Total premiums 4.00 3.67
Total indemnities 4.30 3.95
Total premium subsidies 2.37 2.17
Administrative and operating cost 0.92 0.84
Underwriting gains 0.40 0.37
Taxpayer cost of crop insurance 3.99 3.66
complish this 8 percent cut in the
crop insurance program with no im-
pact on the total amount of insur-
ance provided to U.S. farmers.
Of course, the beneficiaries of
optional units can be expected to
fight their elimination. The primary
beneficiaries are crop insurance
agents, who will find that their com-
missions will be cut by about 8 per-
cent; crop insurance companies,
which will have reduced underwrit-
ing gains; and farmers, who will
have reduced payments. But if cuts
are going to be made, one would
hope that they are made with an
objective of doing the least harm to
the mission of the agency or pro-
gram being cut. Elimination of op-
tional units is the type of reform
that makes sense in an era of scarce
federal resources. ◆
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Green Box programs are minimally
trade or production distorting.
Both the United States and the
European Union have significantly
altered their agricultural programs
over the last few years. They have
moved a great deal of their subsidies
to direct payments to agricultural en-
tities. The U.S. direct and counter-
cyclical payments and the E.U. Single
Farm Payments all fit the description
of direct payments. Given the current
structure of the Green Box and the
new definition of the Blue Box, U.S.
direct payments and E.U. Single Farm
Payments would be filed as Green Box.
U.S. countercyclical payments would
go in the Blue Box. These moves give
the United States and the European
Union a great deal of flexibility in deal-
ing with the proposed reductions.
However, the WTO panel ruling
on the Brazil-U.S. cotton dispute has
concluded that U.S. direct payments
“do not fully conform” to the guide-
lines for Green Box direct payments
because of their exclusion of fruit
and vegetable production on the
payment-base acreage. By the same
measure, E.U. Single Farm Payments,
too, would not conform to the
Green Box requirements. However, it
should be relatively easy to fix both
issues, so this is probably of minor
concern to U.S. and E.U. negotiators.
The framework explicitly states
that the reductions in total AMS per-
mitted levels “will result in reduc-
tions of some product-specific
support.” But true reductions may
not materialize because there are
loopholes in market price support
(MPS) programs, and member states
still have flexibility to provide sup-
port through other mechanisms. The
change in Japanese rice policy in the
late 1990s provides one example of
an MPS loophole. Another example
would be if the United States made
superficial changes to the dairy and
sugar programs to fulfill a target in
product-specific support reductions
without truly affecting actual sup-
port. The United States could also
lower loan rates in the marketing
loan program (reducing product-
specific AMS) and augment the
countercyclical program to make up
the support difference (by changing
the target price). Aggregate support
would remain the same but would
shift from the Amber Box to the Blue
Box. The ability of reductions in total
AMS permitted levels to force reduc-
tions in product-specific support will
also hinge on the product-specific
AMS limits. These limits have yet to
be determined, although the frame-
work does state that the limits will be
based on “respective average lev-
els.” To guarantee product-specific
support reductions, the final level
of total permitted AMS must be less
than the sum of the product-spe-
cific AMS limits.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
MOVING FORWARD
The issues embedded in the current
WTO agriculture negotiations are
numerous because of the multitude
of agricultural programs used by
member states throughout the
world. Putting all of the programs
into categories has allowed negotia-
tors and their advisers to condense
this support into manageable points
so that further clarifications can be
Continued on page 11
